



United States
Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration
International Nuclear Security

**M7: IAEA Guidance for Coordination of
Security Response and Emergency Response
at Research Reactors**

Research Reactor Sabotage Protection Workshop





Learning Objectives

Objectives:

- Become familiar with IAEA guidance on emergency response at a research reactor facility
- Understand the roles and responsibilities of security response forces and emergency response organizations
- Discuss good practices for coordination of emergency response and security response

IAEA Safety Standards for Preparedness and Response at a Research Reactor (1)

- IAEA Safety Standards for Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency are presented in General Safety Requirements - GSR Part 7 (2015)
 - Applies to nuclear or radiological emergencies irrespective of the cause (including a nuclear security event)
 - Establishes emergency response requirements
 - Is intended to be consistent with IAEA NSS guidance
- Specific guidance for research reactors is provided in EPR-RESEARCH REACTOR (2011)



IAEA Guidance for Emergency Response at a Research Reactor (2)

- Low power research reactors are Threat Category III facilities
 - Fuel failure is unlikely
 - An emergency threatening members of the public beyond the site boundary is unlikely and PAZ/UPZ are within the site boundary
- High-power reactors are Threat Category II facilities
 - Emergencies can be more severe
 - PAZ is normally within the site boundary, and UPZ may extend a few km outward
- An MTR facility is likely a Threat Category II facility


UPZ - urgent protective action planning zone
PAZ - precautionary action zone

IAEA Guidance for Emergency Response at a Research Reactor (3)

- Emergency response process and objectives
 - Early Phase
 - Stabilize the reactor condition
 - Assess the emergency and initiate mitigative actions
 - Minimize radiation exposure to on-site personnel and off-site responders
 - Middle Phase
 - Request appropriate off-site assistance
 - Determine the need for off-site protective action
 - Keep the public informed
 - Late Phase
 - Return the facility to a normal operations

IAEA Guidance for Emergency Response at a Research Reactor (4)

- Emergency classification for Threat Cat II facilities
- The level of classification dictates the scope and timing of response actions
- Security event results in an activation of the Emergency Plan



| Declare a General Emergency if: | Declare a Site Area Emergency if: | Declare a Facility Emergency if: | Declare an Alert if: | |
|---|--|---|---|---|
| Security event (intruder or terrorist attack) <i>Note that the site Security Plan may require actions in addition to the emergency response procedures.</i> | Security event causes containment damage and Security event causes core damage | Security event causes containment damage or Security event causes core damage | Security event, actual or threatened, that could result in damage to any safety system operation or the reactor | Credible security threat to the reactor or reactor safety systems |

IAEA Guidance for Emergency Response at a Research Reactor (5)

- Emergency response priorities


| Priority | Action | Response Time Objective for Emergency Class | | | |
|----------|--|--|---------------------|---|-------|
| | | General Emergency | Site Area Emergency | Facility Emergency | Alert |
| 1 | Classify event based on reactor and radiological conditions | Initial classification — within 15 minutes of recognizing an emergency condition Subsequent classification — Review periodically and when conditions change or new information is available | | | |
| | Notify on-site personnel and facility management | Complete within 15 minutes of classification | | | |
| | Notify off-site authorities | Within 15 minutes of classification | | Within 1 hour of classification | |
| | Recommend on-site protective actions | Immediately after classification and after major changes in radiological conditions; complete implementation within 1 hour | | | |
| | Activate on-site Emergency Response Team | Determine needed support and request immediately after classification; complete within 2 hours | | | |
| | Obtain support of off-site emergency services | Request support as soon as the need is recognized | | | |
| 2 | Develop environmental monitoring plan | Within 30 minutes after classification | | | |
| | Deploy on-site environmental monitoring teams | Within 30 minutes after classification; complete within 1 hour | | | |
| | Recommend off-site urgent protective actions | Within 30 minutes after classification | | No off-site protective actions are expected to be required | |
| 3 | Initiate environmental monitoring off-site and near the facility | Within 1 hour after classification | | No off-site environmental monitoring is expected to be required | |
| | Assess environmental monitoring results and revise environmental monitoring plan | On-site — complete within 1 hour after classification Off-site — Continuously, as environmental monitoring results are available | | | |
| | Review urgent protective actions | Continuously, as environmental monitoring results are available | | | |
| 4 | Project off-site radiological consequences | Commence within 1 hour using on-site environmental monitoring results | | No off-site radiological consequences are expected | |

Coordination of Emergency Response and Security Response (1)

- Facility-level response plans are elements of the Operator's license
 - Contingency Plan includes measures to prevent further damage, secure the facility, and protect emergency equipment and personnel
 - Emergency Plan includes measures to mitigate and minimize radiological consequences of sabotage as well as human errors, equipment failure, and natural disaster
 - The contingency plans and emergency plans should be complementary
 - Physical protection and safety should not adversely affect each other
- State should establish a national response framework
 - Ensures that the Operator's response plans are effective and that joint exercises, which simultaneously test emergency and contingency plans are conducted
 - Coordinates response at the State level in accordance with the national response framework

Coordination of Emergency Response and Security Response (2)

- On-site coordination is accomplished through Threat Category II Emergency Response Team
 - Initial coordination involves communication between CAS and Control Room
- Coordination procedures must be documented and exercised



In Conclusion

- IAEA has extensive specific guidance for emergency response at research reactors
- Security Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan are elements of the facility's operating license
- Both plans are expected to be activated during a significant security event
- Coordination between security response and emergency response should be described in procedures and practiced

Questions, Comments, Concerns?